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The EU has faced a diverse range of criticisms over its actions during the Ukraine crisis. While
some observers have accused EU states of being too weak in the face of Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, others suggest that the crisis itself emerged from a misguided attempt by the EU to push
for an Association Agreement with Ukraine. Richard Youngs highlights that the crisis has
encouraged the EU to become a different kind of policy actor, with less emphasis on promoting EU
norms and rules, and a greater focus on the potential geopolitical impact of different policy options.
EU-Ukraine summit 2016: EU Council President Donald Tusk (left), Ukraine’s President Petro
Poroshenko (centre), and EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker. Credits: EEAS (CC
BY-NC 2.0)
Most assessments of the EU’s response to the Ukraine-Russia conflict have been highly critical. Criticisms have
come from diametrically opposed directions. While many analysts admonish the EU and its member states for
having been overly weak and insipid, others accuse European governments of intruding clumsily into the Eastern
Partnership (EaP) region without thinking through Russia’s likely reaction or interests. In a new book, I stake out a
different line, showing that the eastern crisis has pushed the EU towards a new kind of geopolitics.
From late 2013, the common call has been for the EU to get more ‘geopolitical’ in dealing with the Ukraine conflict
and other crises in its neighbourhood. While commanding widespread assent, however, this plea in itself does not
add a great deal of precision, as several different types of strategy can be classified as ‘geopolitical’.
In my book, I offer a typology of different kinds of possible geopolitical strategies and argue that EU policy
responses in the Eastern Partnership region can be defined as a hybrid or liberal-redux geopolitics. This conveys
the idea of an upgraded EU diplomacy mixing offensive and defensive tactics, and of the union using its distinctive
tools aimed at deepening cooperation with EaP states, interdependence and political transformation, both more
instrumentally and more variably to further immediate-term security interests. The category is ‘redux’ liberal in the
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sense of the EU using core liberal-cooperative practices in ways that are more selective and calibrated than in
previous European policies, and superimposed with a layer of geo-strategic diplomacy.
The EU’s emerging liberal-redux geopolitics includes a number of components that have gradually taken shape in
the last three years. The EU has offered some elements of stronger strategic backing to EaP states, while also
keeping the region as a ‘middle-land’ between it and a more abrasive Russia. Elements of EU responses suggest at
least some implicit acceptance of Russia’s view that the region should be geo-strategically managed – juggled in an
east-west balance, sometimes not sitting easily with what citizens in EaP states might prefer.
In the triangular relationship between the EU, Russia and EaP partners, a geopolitics of asymmetry has taken root.
European governments have adopted some new elements of strategic policy in response to Russian actions and
developments in the EaP states. But they have not sought to mirror the Russian understanding of geopolitics – nor
has the EU as a whole understood security challenges in the same way as the EaP partners. The EU’s response to
Russia has shifted from a logic of inclusion to one of partial exclusion. Although the EU has used restrictive
measures elsewhere in the world, this is the most notable case of sanctions being used as a central pillar of
European statecraft.
Sanctions are off-set by selective accommodation and a very modest form of strategic balancing. In parallel to
restrictive measures, some European governments have focused on more classical forms of diplomacy that seek
trade-offs with Russia outside the scope of EU institutional instruments. And EU policies to the east now build in ‘the
Russia factor’ in a way that the EaP had conspicuously not previously done.
The EU has not allowed its Russia policy entirely to dictate its EaP policy, but neither has its EaP policy entirely
taken precedence over its Russia policy. Many in the EU and member states have veered toward the logic of joint
negotiation with Russia over core issues in the region. The EU’s new preference is for bounded containment. This
mixes elements that unwind interdependence with those that actually solidify the logic of inclusion in terms of talking
with Russia on Ukraine’s trade arrangements, internal political arrangements and conflict mediation issues.
‘Euromaidan’: Ukrainians protesting their government’s decision to suspend the signing of
the association agreement with the EU. November 2013 Kiev, Ukraine. Credits: Mstyslav
Chernov (CC BY-SA 3.0)
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The EU has offered stronger support for the six EaP partners (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine), but there has been no effort to gain strategic primacy in the EaP space. The EU has not undertaken the
kind of geopolitical ‘tactical retreat’ that ‘defensive realists’ advocate. Indeed, the EU has upgraded its commitments
to the EaP. Yet neither has the EU moved far in the other direction of seeking to assert greater tutelage over the
region as the best way of protecting its interests. Russia’s presence within contested zones in Moldova, Georgia
and Ukraine has dissuaded many EU member states from any dramatically upgraded commitments to these
countries.
The EU has declined to offer EaP states full protection or assume responsibility for their security and territorial
integrity. It has offered neither the prospect of EU accession, nor major new benefits short of membership. Overall,
European financial support to EaP partners has increased, but not dramatically. If the EU has not fully retreated from
the region, neither have its efforts sufficed to gain significantly more strategic influence over EaP states.
The EU has been both more insistent that its geopolitical advantage lies in its focus on democratic reforms in EaP
partners and less rigid in the tactics through which it pursues that focus. The reform-oriented dimension of EU
policies is now framed and calibrated more instrumentally as a tool of purposive power – sometimes enhanced for
this use, at other times set aside where this is judged to be geopolitically optimal.
In terms of direct involvement in the on-going Donbas conflict, member states have been extremely wary and the EU
as a whole appears willing to accept a degree of implicit ‘defeat’ in eastern Ukraine and allow Russia to take
practical control not only of Crimea but also limited parts of the Donbas region. This is judged to be an outcome less
damaging to European interests than open conflict with Russia. The geopolitical script is one of indirect conflict
containment rather than direct measures of conflict transformation. Ukrainians are strongly critical of this passivity.
Overall, the Russia-Ukraine crisis has contributed to making the EU a different kind of foreign policy actor. The EU
has shifted towards a more consequentialist-utilitarian foreign policy, less clearly driven by the union’s institutionally
embedded norms and identity.
The most powerful European foreign policy dynamic prior to the crisis was that of a somewhat automatic,
isomorphic roll-over of internal EU rules and norms into the EaP space. After the crisis, this dynamic has ceded
ground to more consequentialist balancing of the geopolitical impact of different policy options. Certain member
states have also become more predominant actors relative to the EU institutions. Most member states express deep
unease with the German and French lead and positions in the Minsk peace process. Yet the other member states
have themselves ceded power to Germany and France to limit their own exposure and commitment to the crisis.
The EU’s half-new eastern policy has been half-effective. The EU has not been able to resolve the crisis nor prevent
tragic loss of life, but it has, at best, managed to uneasily contain instability and conflict from spiralling more
seriously out of control. Its own power stands attenuated, but the crisis has equally revealed the limits to Russian
power.
Looking longer-term, liberal-redux geopolitics may be set to infuse multiple areas of external policy. It may not be a
consciously and coherently applied EU foreign policy doctrine yet, but it is becoming, more loosely, something akin
to an EU geopolitical style. And as it does so, traditional ways of conceptualising the EU as a foreign policy actor
need revising and updating.
Please read our comments policy before commenting .
Note: This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy, nor
of the London School of Economics.
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